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ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS IN COORDINATION GAMES
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DOI：10.2307/2951699.png)
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摘要
En 中文
This paper proposes a model of the process by which players learn to play repeated coordination games, with the goal of understanding the results of some recent experiments. In those experiments the dynamics of subjects' strategy choices and the resulting patterns of discrimination among equilibria varied systematically with the rule for determining payoffs and the size of the interacting groups, in ways that are not adequately explained by available methods of analysis. The model suggests a possible explanation by showing how the dispersion of subjects' beliefs interacts with the learning process to determine the probability distribution of its dynamics and limiting outcome.
Keyword:
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
COORDINATION
LEARNING
STRATEGIC UNCERTAINTY
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
