.png){kind=icon}
返回
Allocative efficiency in simulated multiple-unit combinatorial auctions with quantity support
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.ejor.2009.06.012.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
We study the behavior of the Quantity Support Mechanism, a support tool, which suggests new bids for bidders in semi-sealed-bid combinatorial auctions. The support tool gives bidders a shortlist of provisionally winning bids (price-quantity combinations) they can choose from. We conducted a series of simulations to test the efficiency of the final allocations in the auctions. Our results indicate that quantity support auctions are more efficient than auctions without it, although the theoretical optimum is not always reached. Also, in our experiments, quantity support auctions led to a lower total cost to the buyer than non-combinatorial auctions, where the items were auctioned individually. The simulation results also show that the QSM cannot entirely overcome the threshold problem and what we call the puzzle problem. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
Auctions/bidding
Decision support systems
Combinatorial auctions
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
6
论文数:
2.2W
被引数:
6.4W
机构
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
查看更多内容