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An allocatively efficient auction for pollution permits
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DOI：10.1007/s10640-021-00543-3.png)
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This article proposes a new auction design for the efficient allocation of pollution permits. We show that if the auctioneer restricts the bidding rule of the uniform-price auction-coupled with a simple ex-post supply adjustment rule-then truthful bidding is obtained. Consequently, the uniform-price auction is more allocatively efficient than conventional formats that are currently observed in pollution markets.
Keyword:
Auctions
Multi-unit
Uniform-price
Efficiency
Pollution
期刊
IF:
3.4
论文数:
2.7K
被引数:
6.5K
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