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Antitrust settlements and trial outcomes
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DOI：10.2307/2109787.png)
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摘要
En 中文
Risk aversion plays an important role in explaining why antitrust cases settle instead of going to trial. Using a jointly estimated model of settlement and trial outcome, we find that a 1% increase in the probability that the plaintiff wins at trial raises the probability of a settlement by 0.13%. We also find that reputation effects are not a significant factor for defendants, so the risk aversion of the defendants does not play a dominant role in determining whether the parties settle. Plaintiffs are more likely to win in certain jurisdictions, which encourages venue shopping by plaintiffs.
Keyword:
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
PRETRIAL NEGOTIATION
LITIGATION
SELECTION
INFORMATION
CLAIMS
DISPOSITION
ALLOCATION
RESOLUTION
DISPUTES
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