arrow
返回

Approval Voting

delete2026-11-04
delete0
PRE
AI
S
Steven J. Brams
P
Peter C. Fishburn
DOI:10.2307/1955105delete
delete原文链接
delete分享
delete收藏
摘要

摘要

En 中文
Approval voting is a method of voting in which voters can vote for (“approve of”) as many candidates as they wish in an election. This article analyzes properties of this method and compares it with other single-ballot nonranked voting systems. Among the theorems proved is that approval voting is the most sincere and most strategyproof of all such voting systems; in addition, it is the only system that ensures the choice of a Condorcet majority candidate if the preferences of voters are dichotomous. Its probable empirical effects would be to (1) increase voter turnout, (2) increase the likelihood of a majority winner in plurality contests and thereby both obviate the need for runoff elections and reinforce the legitimacy of first-ballot outcomes, and (3) help centrist candidates, without at the same time denying voters the opportunity to express their support for more extremist candidates. The latter effect's institutional impact may be to weaken the two-party system yet preserve middle-of-the-road public policies of which most voters approve.
AI总结

AI总结

对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取,主要内容包括:简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。

期刊

American Political Science Review 封面图
American Political Science Review
IF:
5.8
论文数:
8.8K
被引数:
2.1W

机构

N
New York University
学者数:
1.1K
论文数: 539
被引数: 0
P
pennsylvania state university
学者数:
1.4K
论文数: 622
被引数: 0
引用论文

引用论文

暂无论文信息