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Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
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DOI：10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.009.png)
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摘要
En 中文
We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginal-decreasing piecewise-constant curves and quantity-based side constraints, We develop a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the multiunit allocation problem, which computes a (1+epsilon) approximation in worst-case time T = O(n(3)/epsilon), given n bids each with a constant number of pieces. We integrate this approximation scheme within a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and compute payments for an asymptotic cost of O(T log n). The maximal possible gain from manipulation to a bidder in the combined scheme is bounded by epsilonV/(l+epsilon), where V is the total surplus in the efficient outcome. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
approximation algorithm
multiunit auctions
strategyproof
approximately-strategyproof
bidding language
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6.8
论文数:
3.8K
被引数:
1.5W
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