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Abstract
En 中文
There is a natural view of the relationship between preference and choice: an option is choiceworthy if and only if no alternative is strictly preferred to it. I argue against this view on two grounds. First, it makes false predictions about which options are choiceworthy in games and in multidimensional choice settings. Second, it conflates two distinct attitudes: choiceworthiness, which is assessed ex ante, and preference, which is assessed ex post. I explore the consequences of rejecting this natural view, including how it simplifies the relationship between game theory and decision theory, and how it complicates debates about what Ruth Chang calls parity between options.
Keywords:
choiceworthiness
preference
decision theory
game theory
parity
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