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Attack-Resilient TLS Certificate Transparency
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DOI：10.1109/ACCESS.2020.2996997.png)
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摘要
En 中文
The security of Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) for Internet-based communications has lately attracted researchers' attention because of Certification Authorities (CAs) crashes and consequent attacks. Google Certificate Transparency and subsequent log-based PKI proposals (e.g., AKI and ARPKI) have succeeded in making certificate-management processes more transparent, accountable, and verifiable. However, those proposals failed to solve the root CA generous delegation of trust to intermediate CAs, non-conformant certificate-issuance by them, and lack of rigorous authentication of domain ownership during certificate-issuance problems. This study presents Attack-Resilient TLS Certificate Transparency (ARCT) based on log servers to address these problems. ARCT enables root CA to enforce intermediate CAs to follow community standards through leveraging a log server at each root level. It also introduces a collaborative domain ownership verification method that deters false certificate-issuance and ensures that a set of CAs validates every certificate before any client will accept it. A certificate collectively approved by a set of CAs assures users that the certificate has been seen, and not instantly detected malicious, by a group of CAs. Finally, formal security and performance evaluations prove the reliability and effectiveness of ARCT.
Keyword:
Servers
Proposals
Public key
Google
Authentication
TLS
PKI
log server
delegation of trust
collaborative identity verification
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期刊
IF:
3.6
论文数:
9.8W
被引数:
29.4W
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