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Auction-Based Mechanism for Dynamic and Efficient Resource Allocation
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DOI：10.1109/TSMC.2016.2581025.png)
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摘要
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We study how to efficiently allocate the infinitesimal divisible resource under auction mechanism in a dynamic way. We propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-type auction mechanism with a 2-D bid which specifies a per unit price and a maximum of the demand. Due to the absence of enough information related to the infinite dimensional valuations of individual players in a single-bid strategy, it is challenging to implement the efficient Nash equilibrium (NE) in a dynamic way. In this paper, we introduce a pair of parameters related to players' valuations, and design a decentralized dynamic process assisted with this pair of values, such that at each iteration, a single player updates its best bid under a constrained set of demand. Under the proposed auction mechanism, we show the incentive compatibility, efficiency, and uniqueness of the NE. Furthermore, our method is guaranteed to converge to the efficient NE, and it presents the enhanced convergence performance compared with those methods proposed in the literature. Case studies are given to demonstrate the results developed in this paper.
Keyword:
Auction
convergence
decentralized algorithm
efficiency
Nash equilibrium (NE)
resource allocation
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期刊
IF:
10.5
论文数:
1.1W
被引数:
5.0W
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