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Auditor reputation building

delete2002-12-17
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AI
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Brian W. Mayhew
DOI:10.1111/1475-679X.00030delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
This paper reports the results of air experimental economics study designed to examine reputation building by information verifiers (auditors). The results identify boundary conditions to reputation formation and supply insight into auditors' incentives to form reputations. Reputations form in all sessions of treatments that supply nearly immediate rewards to participants who adopt reputation equilibrium strategies. In contrast, reputations form in less than half of the sessions of a treatment where participants have to maintain reputation equilibrium strategies for number of periods before the market rewards their effort. The results suggest the immediacy of rewards for adopting reputation strategies is a critical determinant of reputation formation.
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期刊

Journal of Accounting Research 封面图
Journal of Accounting Research
IF:
6.3
论文数:
1.7K
被引数:
1.3W

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