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Avoiding diversionary targets
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DOI：10.1177/0022343304044475.png)
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This article identifies three common flaws in the empirical literature on the diversionary use of force. First, while theoretical models of the diversionary use of force are built on the motivations of leaders to stay in power, the great majority of empirical studies employ datasets with the country or country-year as their unit of analysis. Second, while theories of the diversionary use of force strongly suggest a reciprocal relationship between the probabilities of losing office and international conflict, almost no studies have explicitly modeled such a reciprocal relationship. Third, most empirical studies ignore how the diversionary incentives of leaders might affect the strategic calculus of their potential foreign opponents. This article explicitly addresses these common flaws by using a dataset with the leader-year as the unit of analysis and by employing a two-stage probit model to examine a reciprocal relationship between the probabilities of losing office and becoming a target, thus focusing on targets. The authors find only qualified support for the modified strategic theory of diversionary conflict. On the one hand, as the risk of losing office increases, leaders become less likely to be targets in an international crisis. On the other hand, however, the risk of becoming a target in an international crisis does not affect the probability of losing office.
Keyword:
STRATEGIC INTERACTION
CONFLICT
WAR
DEMOCRACY
TENURE
LEADERSHIP
VARIABLES
BEHAVIOR
FORCE
POWER
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3.1
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
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Can strategic interaction divert diversionary behavior? A model of US conflict propensity.png)
JOURNAL OF POLITICS
JOURNAL OF POLITICSIF3.8
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