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摘要
En 中文
We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of the literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.
Keyword:
SHORT-RUN PLAYERS
REPEATED GAMES
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
LONG-RUN
CREDIBILITY
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期刊
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12.7
论文数:
1.2K
被引数:
4.1W
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