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Bargaining and sharing innovative knowledge
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AI
DOI：10.1111/1467-937X.00130.png)
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摘要
En 中文
We consider the problem of bargaining over the disclosure of interim research knowledge between two participants in an R&D race for an ultimate, patentable invention. Licence fee schedules that are functions of the amount of knowledge disclosed, by the leading to the lagging agent, are examined for their abilities to attain efficient outcomes and varying shares of the surplus arising from disclosure. In her sequential-offers bargaining games, the uninformed buyer is able to elicit full disclosures without sharing the incremental surplus with any type of the licensor, and thus do as well as a perfectly informed and discriminating knowledge licensee.
Keyword:
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
MONOPOLY
EXTERNALITIES
UNCERTAINTY
INCENTIVES
MODEL
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
