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Capacity and entry issues in online exchanges
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DOI：10.1016/j.ejor.2006.12.021.png)
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摘要
En 中文
With the advent of open standards and Internet technologies, the number of sellers who can participate in online exchanges is greatly increased. We model the competition between identical sellers vying for the same business, and find that there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium in prices. The results help us understand the dynamics between a seller's capacity and his motivation to participate in an auction. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
auctions
economics
game theory
online exchanges
supplier competition
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期刊
IF:
6
论文数:
2.2W
被引数:
6.4W
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