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Carbon Offsetting-Driven Multi-Actor Low-Carbon Collaborative Evolutionary Game Analysis
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DOI：10.3390/su15129167.png)
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The proactive strategic choice for low-carbon collaboration among various sectors of society is to promote low-carbon transformation of the industrial chain through carbon offsetting. This study delves into the strategy selection and game process of carbon offset actions with participation from businesses, government, and public, thus revealing the dynamic evolutionary relationship of the behavior of each stakeholder. A multi-agent low-carbon collaboration evolutionary game model is established, driven by carbon compensation. The game process undergoes an evolutionary trend simulation, strategy evolution analysis, and key parameter sensitivity analysis, ultimately identifying the optimal cooperative mode and key influencing factors among various stakeholders. The study found that an evolutionary equilibrium and stable strategy exists in the game process of enterprise, government, and public participation in carbon offsetting. The initial participation willingness of each stakeholder has an impact on the strategy choices of other stakeholders. Behaviors such as leading by example, punishment for violators, reasonable subsidy intensity, and active public supervision have a positive effect in promoting carbon offsetting policies and low-carbon collaboration. The research findings offer theoretical insights into promoting efficient multi-party green cooperation and accomplishing low-carbon transformation of the industrial chain under the 'dual-carbon' goal.
Keyword:
carbon offsetting
low carbon collaboration
evolutionary game
stabilization strategy
期刊
IF:
3.3
论文数:
10.7W
被引数:
28.4W
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分享收藏Willingness to pay for carbon offset certification and co-benefits among (high-)flying young adults in the UK.png)
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