返回
Causal generative models are just a start
DOI:10.1017/S0140525X17000115.png)
摘要
En 中文
Human reasoning is richer than Lake et al. acknowledge, and the emphasis on theories of how images and scenes are synthesized is misleading. For example, the world knowledge used in vision presumably involves a combination of geometric, physical, and other knowledge, rather than just a causal theory of how the image was produced. In physical reasoning, a model can be a set of constraints rather than a physics engine. In intuitive psychology, many inferences proceed without detailed causal generative models. How humans reliably perform such inferences, often in the face of radically incomplete information, remains a mystery.
期刊
IF:
13.7
论文数:
1.6W
被引数:
1.2W
机构
引用论文
Reconciling Intuitive Physics and Newtonian Mechanics for Colliding Objects调和碰撞物体的直觉物理学和牛顿力学
PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
IF5.8
Human-level concept learning through probabilistic program induction通过概率程序归纳进行人类水平的概念学习
SCIENCE
IF45.8
没有更多内容

