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Central Bank Design

delete2013-11-01
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Ricardo Reis *
DOI:10.1257/jep.27.4.17delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
Starting with a blank slate, how could one design the institutions of a central bank for the United States? This paper explores the question of how to design a central bank, drawing on the relevant economic literature and historical experiences while staying free from concerns about how the Fed got to be what it is today or the short-term political constraints it has faced at various times. The goal is to provide an opinionated overview that puts forward the trade-offs associated with different choices and identifies areas where there are clear messages about optimal central bank design.
Keyword:
MONETARY-POLICY
INTEREST-RATES
BALANCE-SHEET
INFLATION
COMMUNICATION
RULES
DISCRETION
FRAMEWORK
CONSENSUS
PRICES
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期刊

J
Journal of Economic Perspectives
IF:
8.8
论文数:
1.8K
被引数:
2.0W

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