.png){kind=icon}
返回
CEO optimism and forced turnover
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.004.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
We show theoretically that optimism can lead a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to choose the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholder value. Optimism below (above) the interior optimum leads the CEO to underinvest (over-invest). Hence, if boards of directors act in the interests of shareholders, CEOs with relatively low or high optimism face a higher probability of forced turnover than moderately optimistic CEOs face. Using a large sample of turnovers, we find strong empirical support for this prediction. The results are consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial optimism that maximizes firm value. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
CEO turnover
Optimism
Overconfidence
Managerial biases
期刊
IF:
12
论文数:
3.8K
被引数:
5.5W
机构
引用论文
Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: A long-term perspective.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
PREAI
分享收藏
查看更多内容