arrow
返回

Choosing a batch to be processed

delete2023-03-17
delete0
PRE
AI
T
Tzvi Alon *
M
Moshe Haviv
DOI:10.1007/s10479-023-05274-wdelete
delete原文链接
delete原文求助
delete分享
delete收藏
摘要

摘要

En 中文
Suppose identical jobs need to be processed by a single processor. Processing is carried out one job after the other, in batches, and jobs are released only when their entire batch is done. Each job is held by an agent, who tries to minimize costs. The cost of an individual job is linear in two terms: a congestion cost, dependent on the size of the batch, and a lateness cost, dependent also on the number of jobs preceding the batch. The agents need to decide on the sequential index of the batch they ascribe to. This decision problem is stated as a non-cooperative game, with applications both in ride sharing and in queues in which the server must never be idle. We derive its (mixed) symmetric equilibrium, which always exists, and its pure non-symmetric equilibrium, when it exists. The corresponding social optimization problem is solved as well, leading, in the mixed symmetric case, to an explicit formula for the price of anarchy.
Keyword:
Game theory
Scheduling
Symmetric equilibrium
Pure equilibrium

期刊

Annals of Operations Research 封面图
Annals of Operations Research
IF:
4.5
论文数:
8.0K
被引数:
2.1W

机构

H
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
学者数:
2.8W
论文数: 2.3W
被引数: 2.7W
引用论文

引用论文

err分享
err收藏
Tempi Delle Città
err1998-09-01
err0
PREAI
errM. Carmen Belloni
err分享
err收藏
err
IF0
err
err0
PREAI
err
err分享
err收藏
学者 查看更多内容