返回
摘要
En 中文
Suppose identical jobs need to be processed by a single processor. Processing is carried out one job after the other, in batches, and jobs are released only when their entire batch is done. Each job is held by an agent, who tries to minimize costs. The cost of an individual job is linear in two terms: a congestion cost, dependent on the size of the batch, and a lateness cost, dependent also on the number of jobs preceding the batch. The agents need to decide on the sequential index of the batch they ascribe to. This decision problem is stated as a non-cooperative game, with applications both in ride sharing and in queues in which the server must never be idle. We derive its (mixed) symmetric equilibrium, which always exists, and its pure non-symmetric equilibrium, when it exists. The corresponding social optimization problem is solved as well, leading, in the mixed symmetric case, to an explicit formula for the price of anarchy.
Keyword:
Game theory
Scheduling
Symmetric equilibrium
Pure equilibrium
期刊
IF:
4.5
论文数:
8.0K
被引数:
2.1W
机构
引用论文
Anti-arthritic Effect of the Spirocyclopiperazinium Salt Compound LXM-15 in Rats and Its Underlying MechanismLXM-15螺环哌嗪鎓盐化合物的抗关节炎作用及其作用机制
Inflammation
IF0
The Continuing Value of a Planned Community: Radburn in the Evolution of Suburban Development规划社区持续的价值:拉德朋在郊区发展演变中的作用

