.png){kind=icon}
返回
Commitment vs. flexibility
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00666.x.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
We study the optimal trade-off between commitment and flexibility in a consumption-savings model. Individuals expect to receive relevant information regarding tastes and thus they value the flexibility provided by larger choice sets. On the other hand, they also expect to suffer from temptation, with or without self-control, and thus they value the commitment afforded by smaller choice sets. The optimal commitment problem we study is to find the best subset of the individual's budget set. This problem leads to a principal-agent formulation. We find that imposing a minimum level of savings is always a feature of the solution. Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for minimum-savings policies to completely characterize the solution. We also discuss other applications, such as the design of fiscal constitutions, the problem faced by a paternalist, and externalities.
Keyword:
intertemporal preferences
commitment
flexibility
hyperbolic discounting
social security
temptation
self-control
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
7.1
论文数:
3.0K
被引数:
4.3W
机构
暂无机构信息
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
分享收藏
查看更多内容