.png){kind=icon}
返回
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
摘要
En 中文
We propose a labor market model in which financial firms compete for a scarce supply of workers who can be employed as either bankers or traders. While hiring bankers helps create a surplus that can be split between a firm and its trading counterparties, hiring traders helps the firm appropriate a greater share of that surplus away from its counterparties. Firms bid defensively for workers bound to become traders, who then earn more than bankers. As counterparties employ more traders, the benefit of employing bankers decreases. The model sheds light on the historical evolution of compensation in finance.
Keyword:
ALLOCATION
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
9.5
论文数:
4.0K
被引数:
5.0W
机构
引用论文
Transitions: Career and family life cycles of the educational elite.png)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW.png)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
PREAI
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
查看更多内容