Competition in loan contracts

doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1311

2001-12-01

PRE

Christine A. Parlour *

Rajan, U

DOI：10.1257/aer.91.5.1311

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摘要

En 中文

We present a model of an unsecured loan market. Many lenders simultaneously offer loan contracts (a debt level and an interest rate) to a borrower. The borrower may accept more than one contract. Her payoff if she defaults increases in the total amount borrowed. If this payoff is high enough, deterministic zero-profit equilibria cannot be sustained. Lenders earn a positive profit, and may even charge the monopoly price. The positive-profit equilibria are robust to increases in the number of lenders. Despite the absence of asymmetric information, the competitive outcome does not obtain in the limit.

Keyword:

BANKRUPTCY

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期刊

American Economic Review

IF:

11.6

论文数:

5.0K

被引数:

7.5W

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