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Computing supergame equilibria
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AI
DOI：10.1111/1468-0262.00445.png)
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摘要
En 中文
We present a general method for computing the set of supergame equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and public randomization. We present a three-stage algorithm that constructs a convex set containing the set of equilibrium values, constructs another convex set contained in the set of equilibrium values, and produces strategies that support them. We explore the properties of this algorithm by applying it to familiar games.
Keyword:
supergames
Nash equilibrium
computation
monotone convex set-valued operators
