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Constrained-Efficient Capital Reallocation
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DOI：10.1257/aer.20210902.png)
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摘要
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We characterize efficiency in an equilibrium model of investment and capital reallocation with heterogeneous firms facing collateral constraints. The model features two types of pecuniary externalities: collateral externalities, because the resale price of capital affects collateral constraints, and distributive externalities, because buyers of old capital are more financially constrained than sellers, consis-tent with empirical evidence. We prove that the stationary equilib-rium price of old capital is inefficiently high because the distributive externality exceeds the collateral externality, by a factor of two when we calibrate the model. New investment reduces the future price of old capital, providing a rationale for new-investment subsidies. (JEL D21, D24, D25, D62, E22, G31, G32)
Keyword:
EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL
CREDIT SHOCKS
STOCK-MARKET
INVESTMENT
EXTERNALITIES
MISALLOCATION
PRODUCTIVITY
FRICTIONS
DYNAMICS
POLICIES
期刊
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
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