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Contracts as Reference Points-Experimental Evidence
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DOI：10.1257/aer.101.2.493.png)
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摘要
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Hart and John Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long-term contracts and the employment relation. We examine experimentally their idea that contracts serve as reference points. The evidence confirms the prediction that there is a trade-off between rigidity and flexibility. Flexible contracts-which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions-cause significant shading in ex post performance, while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. (JEL D44, D86, J41)
Keyword:
GIFT EXCHANGE
LABOR-MARKET
FAIRNESS
COMPETITION
OWNERSHIP
期刊
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W
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引用论文
CONTRACTS, REFERENCE POINTS, AND COMPETITION-BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATION
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