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Abstract
Does human cognition depend on a set of representational systems that are domain-specific, task-specific, and encapsulated? Studies of human infants and of non-human animals suggest that representations of extended surface layouts, manipulable objects, intentional agents, and approximate numerosities depend on just such modular core knowledge systems. In contrast, studies of human adults, and some studies of trained non-human animals, suggest that representations of space, objects, agents, and numerosity depend on a more flexible cognitive architecture. In this review, I attempt to bridge these findings and suggest that mature human cognitive performance depends in part on the same domain-specific systems found in infants and non-human animals.
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