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Corruption and forest concessions
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DOI：10.1016/j.jeem.2011.05.007.png)
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We examine how corruption impacts a central government's application of concession policy instruments consisting of royalty rates, concession size, environmentally sensitive logging levels, and enforcement. Harvesters have incentives to illegally log by taking more volume than is allowed, high grading through removal of only the highest valued and best formed trees, and shirking environmentally sensitive logging requirements, all of which reduce public goods produced from native tropical forests. Corruption is introduced through logging inspectors who can be bribed by harvesters to avoid fines associated with illegal logging. Both the theory and a simulation are used to compare policy design under corruption and no corruption. (C) 2011 Published by Elsevier Inc.
Keyword:
Concessions
Corruption
Bribery
Deforestation
Illegal logging
期刊
IF:
5.9
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
1.2W
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