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Credit Claiming by Labeling
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DOI：10.1177/00104140231169016.png)
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摘要
En 中文
We examine a phenomenon we call credit claiming by labeling in which a sitting politician places her name on a project, program, or policy with the goal of claiming credit for it. While the prevalence of this practice suggests that many politicians believe that credit claiming by labeling will aid their careers, there is little existing evidence on this question. We examine the effects of credit claiming by labeling with a survey experiment in Argentina. We find that it has a negative, though small, effect on respondents' attitudes. Descriptive data suggests that these results stem from the perceived pervasiveness of the practice. We then use evidence from an additional treatment on the (un)biased selection of program beneficiaries to show that respondents actually reward politicians who neither label nor manipulate programs. These results suggest substantial obstacles to overturning citizens' negative baseline beliefs about the politicized implementation of government programs.
Keyword:
credit claiming
voter attitudes
social policy
clientelism
survey experiment
Argentina
期刊
IF:
3.4
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
8.0K
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