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Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms

delete2024-08-01
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PRE
AI
B
Bergemann, Dirk *
B
Bonatti, Alessandro
DOI:10.1257/aer.202304782553delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their match values. The revenue-optimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium,sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off plat-form. The platform exploits its information advantage to increase its bargaining power vis-a-vis the sellers. Finally, privacy-respecting data-governance rules can lead to welfare gains for consumers.
Keyword:
ADVERSE SELECTION
PRIVACY
MARKET
MONOPOLY

期刊

American Economic Review 封面图
American Economic Review
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W

机构

Y
Yale University
学者数:
6.5W
论文数: 6.0W
被引数: 10.0W
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