返回
Decentralized Reactive Power Compensation Using Nash Bargaining Solution
DOI:10.1109/TSG.2015.2500729.png)
摘要
En 中文
We consider a distributed reactive power compensation problem in a distribution network in which users locally generate reactive power using distributed generation units to contribute to the local voltage control. We model and analyze the interaction between one electric utility company and multiple users by using the Nash bargaining theory. On one hand, users determine the amount of active and reactive power generation for their distributed generation units. On the other hand, the electric utility company offers reimbursement for each user based on the amount of reactive power dispatched by that user. We first quantify the benefit for the electric utility company and users in the reactive power compensation problem. Then we derive the optimal solution for the active and reactive power generation, as well as reimbursement for each user under two different bargaining protocols, namely sequential bargaining and concurrent bargaining. Numerical results show that both the electric utility company and users benefit from the proposed decentralized reactive power compensation mechanism, and the overall system efficiency is improved.
Keyword:
Reactive power compensation
demand side management
game theory
Nash bargaining solution
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取,主要内容包括:简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
9.8
论文数:
5.8K
被引数:
4.3W
机构
引用论文
Options for Control of Reactive Power by Distributed Photovoltaic Generators
PROCEEDINGS OF THE IEEE
IF25.9
Multi-Objective Planning for Reactive Power Compensation of Radial Distribution Networks With Unified Power Quality Conditioner Allocation Using Particle Swarm Optimization基于粒子群优化的统一电能质量调节器配置的辐射状配电网无功补偿多目标规划

