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Decentralized task coordination
DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026.png)
摘要
En 中文
We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms, in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function . We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task alloca-tion and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings. (c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
Keyword:
Game theory
Decentralized mechanisms
Implementation
Bargaining
Consistency
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期刊
IF:
6
论文数:
2.2W
被引数:
6.4W
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