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Decoupling management inefficiency: Myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood
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DOI：10.1016/j.irfa.2019.01.004.png)
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摘要
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Using combinations of accounting and stock market performance measures, we advance a comprehensive multidimensional framework for modelling management performance. This framework proposes poor management, myopia, hyperopia and efficient management, as four distinct attributes of performance. We show that these new attributes align with, and extend, existing frameworks for modelling management short-termism. We apply this framework to test the management inefficiency hypothesis using UK data over the period 1988 to 2017. We find that takeover likelihood increases with poor management and myopia, but declines with hyperopia and efficient management. Our results suggest that managers who focus on sustaining long-term shareholders' value, even at the expense of current profitability, are less likely to be disciplined through takeovers. By contrast, managers who pursue profitability at the expense of long-term shareholder value creation are more likely to face takeovers. Finally, we document the role of bidders as enforcers of market discipline.
Keyword:
Hyperopia
Inefficient management hypothesis
Management performance
Myopia
Takeovers
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