.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
Return
Demand commitment in legislative bargaining
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1017/S0003055407070517.png)
.png){kind=icon}
Original request for help.png){kind=icon}
Share.png){kind=icon}
Save
Abstract
En 中文
Morelli (1999) provides a model of government formation in which the parties make payoff demands and the order of moves is chosen by the leading party. Morelli's main proposition states that the ex post distribution of payoffs inside the coalition that forms is proportional to the distribution of relative ex ante bargaining power. We provide a counterexample in which the leading party is able to obtain the entire payoff; furthermore, there are coalitions for which proportional payoff division does not occur for any order of moves.
Keywords:
MAJORITY GAMES
WEIGHTS
AI Summary
Key information extracted from the uploaded paper, including a brief overview, abstract, background, key highlights, visual analysis, and future outlook.
Journal
IF:
5.8
Papers:
8.7K
Citations:
2.1W
Organization
No organization information available