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摘要
En 中文
Many governments assign use licenses for natural resources, such as radio spectrum, fishing rights, and mineral extraction rights, through auctions or other market-like mechanisms. License design affects resource users' investment incentives as well as the efficiency of asset allocation. No existing license design achieves first-best outcomes on both dimensions. Long-term licenses give owners high investment incentives but impede reallocation to high-valued entrants. Short-term licenses improve allocative efficiency but discourage investment. We propose a simple new mechanism, the depreciating license, and we argue that it navigates this trade-off more effectively than existing license designs.
Keyword:
PROPERTY-RIGHTS
TRANSACTION COSTS
MARKET POWER
AUCTIONS
INCENTIVES
EFFICIENCY
ITQS
期刊
A
IF:
5.7
论文数:
1.4K
被引数:
4.4K
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