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Disclosing to Informed Traders
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DOI：10.1111/jofi.13296.png)
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摘要
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We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.
Keyword:
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
MARKET
COST
TRANSPARENCY
LIQUIDITY
QUALITY
CONSEQUENCES
UNCERTAINTY
RETURNS
期刊
IF:
9.5
论文数:
4.0K
被引数:
5.0W
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引用论文
Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure.png)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
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