.png){kind=icon}
返回
Do Delaware CEOs get fired?
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.10.008.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
Critics have charged that state competition in corporate law, which Delaware dominates, leads to a race to the bottom making management unaccountable. We argue that Delaware corporate law attracts firms with particular financial and governance characteristics. We find that Delaware attracts growth firms in industries with more takeover activity. Delaware firms have smaller boards, and their directors are paid more and serve on more boards. In addition, Delaware firms attract greater institutional ownership. We also provide a bottom-line test of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis by examining forced CEO turnover. After controlling for differences in firm characteristics, we find that firms incorporated in Delaware are more likely to terminate CEOs. We also find that that termination decision is less sensitive to poor performance. Overall, we see no clear pattern supporting the race to the bottom hypothesis. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
Corporate governance
Charter competition
CEO turnover
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
J
IF:
3.8
论文数:
6.4K
被引数:
2.4W
机构
引用论文
Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: A long-term perspective.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
PREAI
分享收藏Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointmentsJOURNAL OF FINANCE
OAAI
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
OAAI分享收藏分享收藏
查看更多内容