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Do Director Elections Matter?

delete2017-07-14
delete35
PRE
AI
V
Vyacheslav Fos
李
李凯 (Kai Li) *
M
Margarita Tsoutsoura
DOI：10.1093/rfs/hhx078delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
Using a hand-collected sample of election nominations for more than 30,000 directors over the period 2001-2010, we construct a novel measure of director proximity to elections called Years-to-election. We find that the closer directors of a board are to their next elections, the higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity is. A series of tests, including one that exploits variation in Years-to-election that comes from other boards, supports a causal interpretation. Further analyses show that other governance mechanisms do not drive the relation between board Years-to-election and CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. We conclude that director elections have important implications for corporate governance.
Keyword:
CEO TURNOVER
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
MANAGERIAL ENTRENCHMENT
EXECUTIVE TURNOVER
BOARD COMPOSITION
FIRM PERFORMANCE
STAGGERED BOARDS
PROXY CONTESTS
MARKET
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期刊

Review of Financial Studies 封面图
Review of Financial Studies
IF:
5.4
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
3.0W

机构

B
Boston College
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5.5K
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Cornell University
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6.3W
论文数: 5.4W
被引数: 10.9W
U
University of British Columbia
学者数:
7.0W
论文数: 6.1W
被引数: 8.6W
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