.png){kind=icon}
返回
Do staggered boards harm shareholders?
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.04.002.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
We examine the Cohen and Wang (2013) conclusion that a staggered board lowers firm value based on the stock price reaction to two 2010 Delaware court rulings in the Air gas, Inc. case. The first ruling weakened the potency of a staggered board and the second restored it. We find that the Cohen and Wang results, for their sample, become insignificant after excluding a few penny stocks, stocks with value below $10 million, or over-the-counter (non-exchange) stocks. The effects of the rulings are also insignificant for an alternative sample. (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keyword:
Staggered board
Classified board
Corporate governance
Antitakeover measures
Takeover defense
Airgas
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
12
论文数:
3.8K
被引数:
5.5W
机构
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control
OAAI
OAAI分享收藏
查看更多内容