.png){kind=icon}
返回
DOES DIVORCE LAW MATTER?
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1162/1542476041423359.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when unconstrained transfers are possible only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates. (JEL: C78, J120)
Keyword:
MARRIAGE
期刊
IF:
3.3
论文数:
1.5K
被引数:
6.6K
.png){kind=icon}
查看更多内容