.png){kind=icon}
返回
Does improved information improve incentives?
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
This paper studies the value of more precise signals on agent performance in an optimal contracting model with endogenous effort. With limited liability, the agent's wage is increasing in output only if output exceeds a threshold, else it is zero regardless of output. If the threshold is sufficiently high, the agent only beats it, and is rewarded for increasing output through greater effort, if there is a high noise realization. Thus, a fall in output volatility reduces effort incentives information and effort are substitutes offsetting the standard effect that improved information lowers the cost of compensation. We derive conditions relating the incentive effect to the underlying parameters of the agency problem. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
Executive compensation
Limited liability
Options
Risk management
Relative performance evaluation
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
12
论文数:
3.8K
被引数:
5.5W
机构
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
分享收藏
查看更多内容