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Does pay inequality affect worker effort? Experimental evidence

delete2007-10-01
delete162
PRE
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G
Gary Charness
P
Peter Kuhn *
DOI:10.1086/519540delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
We study worker behavior in an efficiency- wage environment in which coworkers' wages can influence a worker's effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers' responsiveness to coworkers' wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to compress wages. Our laboratory experiments, by contrast, show that while workers' effort choices are highly sensitive to their own wages, effort is not affected by coworkers' wages. This casts doubt on the notion that workers' concerns with equity might explain pay policies such as wage compression or wage secrecy.
Keyword:
SOCIAL PREFERENCES
MARKET
FAIRNESS
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期刊

Journal of Labor Economics 封面图
Journal of Labor Economics
IF:
5
论文数:
1.4K
被引数:
6.1K

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