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Dynamics of Signaling Games
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DOI：10.1137/23M156402X.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
This tutorial describes several basic and much -studied types of interactions with incomplete information, analyzing them by means of evolutionary game dynamics. The games include sender -receiver games, owner -challenger contests, costly advertising, and calls for help. We model the evolution of populations of players reacting to each other and compare adaptive dynamics, replicator dynamics, and best -reply dynamics. In particular, we study signaling norms and nonequilibrium outcomes.
Keywords:
evolutionary games
adaptive dynamics
replicator equation
best-reply dynamics
signaling games
costly signaling
Journal
IF:
6.1
Papers:
888
Citations:
1.2W
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Cited Papers