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Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

delete2014-10-01
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OA
AI
A
Albrecht, James *
P
Pieter A. Gautier
V
Vroman, Susan
DOI:10.1257/aer.104.10.3288delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.
Keyword:
OFFER AUCTIONS
SELLERS
EQUILIBRIUM
SEARCH
PRICES
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期刊

American Economic Review 封面图
American Economic Review
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W

机构

V
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
学者数:
4.2W
论文数: 3.7W
被引数: 3.7W
G
Georgetown University
学者数:
1.6W
论文数: 1.3W
被引数: 1.5W
引用论文

引用论文

Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions
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MECHANISM DESIGN BY COMPETING SELLERS
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