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Efficient manipulation in a repeated setting

delete2004-02-04
delete40
PRE
AI
J
Joel S. Demski *
H
Hans Frimor
D
David E. M. Sappington
DOI:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.00128.xdelete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
We analyze the optimal behavior of an organization when its employees can manipulate the organization's accounting system to their private advantage. We find that the organization may benefit by helping its employees manipulate the system. This help can reduce the employees' private returns from devoting effort to further manipulation of the accounting system, which reduces the cost of motivating the employees to devote their effort to improving the real (rather than the measured) performance of the organization.
Keyword:
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

期刊

Journal of Accounting Research 封面图
Journal of Accounting Research
IF:
6.3
论文数:
1.7K
被引数:
1.3W

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