.png){kind=icon}
返回
Endogenous enforcement institutions
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jdeveco.2017.05.002.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
Faster courts favor economic development in States with sufficiently constrained executive power, whereas they harm development in States where political power is relatively unconstrained. We document this novel pattern across developing countries, and build a simple model of the State as a self-enforcing social contract, which illustrates how power, and institutions that constrain or complement it, affect development. We show a tradeoff between the two facets of power enforcement and expropriation. As the ruler's power grows, his temptation to shirk on enforcement diminishes while the temptation to expropriate grows. Consequently, private enforcement optimally evolves into State enforcement. Moreover, faster courts relax the ruler's incentive constraint on enforcement but tighten his non-expropriation incentive constraint; thus, the effect on development depends on which incentive constraint binds in equilibrium. Our results are consistent with the observed cross-country patterns and with historical evidence on transition from the Law Merchant enforcement system to the State.
Keyword:
Coercive power
Expropriation
Enforcement
State
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
4.6
论文数:
4.1K
被引数:
1.6W
机构
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
分享收藏分享收藏
查看更多内容