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Endogenous lobbying
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DOI：10.1162/jeea.2006.4.1.180.png)
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In this article, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the center of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process. (JEL: D72, D74, D78).
Keyword:
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY
ELECTORAL COMPETITION
POLITICAL-PARTIES
POLICY
MODEL
CANDIDATES
WELFARE
VOTERS
期刊
IF:
3.3
论文数:
1.5K
被引数:
6.6K
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