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Endogenous State Capacity
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DOI：10.1146/annurev-polisci-061621-084709.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Canonical studies of the origins of state capacity have focused on macrohistorical or structural explanations. I review recent research in historical political economy that showcases the role of politics-agents, their constraints, and their motivations-in the evolution of state capacity. Findings from both developed and developing countries emphasize how elite conflict, principal-agent dilemmas, and ethnic and racial differences have shaped agents' preferences for capacity. These new studies demonstrate that state capacity can be strategically manipulated by political and economic elites, and that the various dimensions of state capacity-extractive, coercive, legal-do not necessarily move together. Refocusing our attention on the political drivers of state capacity has also shed light on why there are such stark subnational variations in the development of state capacity, particularly within large polities like India, China, and the United States. The findings point to the need for more nuanced conceptualization and measurement of state capacity.
Keywords:
state capacity
bureaucratic capacity
historical political economy
elite conflict
principal-agent relations
identity politics
Journal
IF:
9.5
Papers:
598
Citations:
7.4K