返回
Enforcement missions: Targets vs budgets
DOI:10.1016/j.jeem.2009.04.005.png)
摘要
En 中文
Enforcement of policy is typically delegated. What sort of mission should the head of an enforcement program be given? When there is more than one firm being regulated the firms' decision problems-otherwise completely separate-become linked in a way that depends on that mission. Under some sorts of missions firms compete to avoid the attention of the enforcer by competitive reductions in the extent of their noncompliance, in others the interaction encourages competitive expansions. We develop a general model that allows for the ordering of some typical classes of missions. We find that in plausible settings 'target-driven' missions (that set a hard target in terms of environmental outcome but flexible budget) achieve the same outcome at lower cost than 'budget-driven' ones (that fix the enforcement budget). Inspection of some fixed fraction of firms is never optimal. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
Enforcement
Regulatory missions
Policy delegation
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取,主要内容包括:简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
5.9
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
1.2W
机构
引用论文
Sluggish dorsally-driven inhibition of return during orthographic processing in adults with dyslexia

