.png){kind=icon}
返回
Equilibrium analysis of a partially observable priority queue
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.cie.2023.109434.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
This study considers a single-server Markovian queue with preemptive priority discipline. In front of a server, two queues are formed: a normal queue for ordinary customers and a priority queue for priority customers. When a customer arrives, they can observe the length of the normal queue, but not the priority queue. By considering the length of the normal queue and the expected waiting time in the priority queue, an arriving customer will choose either the priority queue by paying a priority fee or the normal queue for free. We investigate the customers' equilibrium strategies. Specifically, we find the necessary and sufficient conditions for a threshold-type strategy to be an equilibrium. We also investigate the stability of equilibria. In addition, we examine the effect of information disclosure regarding the length of the priority queue on equilibrium behavior.
Keyword:
Priority queue
Equilibrium strategy
Evolutionarily stable equilibrium
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
6.5
论文数:
1.0W
被引数:
3.8W
机构
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
分享收藏
查看更多内容