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EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT FOR INFINITE NORMAL-FORM GAMES
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DOI：10.2307/2171776.png)
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摘要
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We present three distinct approaches to perfect and proper equilibria for infinite normal form games. In the first two approaches, players ''tremble'' in the infinite games playing full support approximate best responses to others' strategies. In the strong approach, a tremble assigns high probability to the set of pure best responses; in the weak approach, it assigns high probability to a neighborhood of this set. The third, limit-of-finite approach applies traditional refinements to sequences of successively larger finite games. Overall, the strong approach to equilibrium refinement most fully respects the structure of infinite games.
Keyword:
INFINITE GAMES
EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT
FINITE APPROXIMATIONS
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